

## APPENDIX B

Evaluation of FMD Status of Great Britain, On-site visit report, March 12, 2002

## Appendix B

### APHIS/CFIA site visit – FMD outbreak in Great Britain January 28-31, 2002

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The team visited Great Britain January 28-31, 2002. Initial discussions were held at the headquarters of the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in London. Visits were also made to the import facilities at London Heathrow and to the Disease Control Center at Newcastle.

A total of 2,026 confirmed outbreaks of FMD occurred in Great Britain. The first outbreak was confirmed on February 20, 2001, and the last case was on September 30, 2001. The epidemic apparently peaked at the end of March 2001. The cases could be grouped into 12 mini-epidemics. A total of 7 counties were responsible for more than 80% of the outbreaks – Cumbria, Dumfries & Galloway, Northumberland, North Yorkshire, Powys, and Devon. Conversely, 22 counties in England and Wales and all but 2 counties in Scotland never had an outbreak.

With devolved governments, the responsibility for disease control policy rests with DEFRA in England, the Agriculture Department of the National Assembly for Wales (NAWD), and the Environment and Rural Affairs Department of the Scottish Executive (SEERAD). Under agreements with the Scottish Executive and the National Assembly for Wales, the State Veterinary Service provides a national veterinary service for all of Great Britain. The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) is head of the State Veterinary Service. Additional details about the veterinary infrastructure may be found in the OIE report.

Great Britain had estimated animal populations of approximately 11 million cattle, 6 million breeding pigs, and 20 million breeding sheep. These figures are based on June 2000 Agriculture census data.

#### Outbreak summary:

On February 19, 2001, the official veterinarian at a slaughterhouse in Essex reported a suspicion of a vesicular disease in pigs. Animals remaining alive at the slaughterhouse were examined and samples were obtained. Initial laboratory tests were positive and FMD was confirmed the next day – February 20, 2001. This confirmation was done at the World Reference Laboratory, Institute of Animal Health (IAH), Pirbright, England. An FMD virus type O1, pan-Asia strain was identified.

Tracebacks were started immediately from the slaughterhouse. Affected pigs in the slaughterhouse originated from 3 different sources. The oldest lesions in affected pigs were estimated to have been approximately 5 days old. The 3 sources were investigated initially, with no evidence of FMD found on these premises. This finding in combination with the age of lesions led to the conclusion that the pigs were infected after arrival at the slaughterhouse. Thus, tracings were initiated on all premises that had supplied livestock to the slaughterhouse during the previous 2 weeks, with priority being given to any premises that housed a swill-feeding operation.

The source of infection was found through this tracing on a swill-fed pig unit in Tyne & Wear, Northumberland on February 22. Pigs had been sent from these premises to the slaughterhouse on February 15/16. Disease was estimated to have been introduced into these premises around the beginning of February.

Airborne spread of the virus from this index premises was thought to have infected sheep on a neighboring premises. These sheep were subsequently moved through 2 markets – Hexham market in Northumberland and Longtown market in Cumbria – starting on February 13. At Longtown market, the sheep were held overnight and then sold. Disease was spread through these movements such that by the time FMD was confirmed on February 20, disease had already been spread widely across the country. It was estimated that 8 of the 12 mini-epidemics were already infected before the first case was diagnosed.

Movement restrictions were imposed on the entire country on February 23, 2001. The Controlled Area Order prohibited the movement of any livestock in Great Britain except under official control. It also banned any markets, fairs, etc... where animals would be congregated.

The number of outbreaks per week peaked during the week beginning March 20, with 303 confirmed outbreaks. The number of outbreaks confirmed per week continued to fall after that time, with the average number of cases per week falling to 26 in June and 18 in August. The last outbreak was confirmed on September 30, 2001, in Cumbria.

The seven counties previously identified with the largest number of outbreaks reflected the original distribution of sheep from Longtown market. These counties and the number of outbreaks in each county were as follows:

<b>County</b>	<b>No. outbreaks</b>	<b>1<sup>st</sup> outbreak</b>	<b>Last outbreak</b>
Cumbria	893	Feb 28	Sept 30
Devon	173	Feb 25	June 17
No. Yorkshire	133	Mar 7	Aug 18
Durham	85	Feb 27	Sept 4
Northumberland	88	Feb 22	Sept 29
Wales – Powys	70	Feb 28	Aug 12
Scotland – Dumfries & Galloway	176	Mar 1	May 23

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The outbreak was grouped into 12 epidemiological groups, or mini-epidemics. These were centered around outbreaks in Anglesey, Cumbria, Devon, County Durham, Lancashire (East), Essex, Hereford & Worcester, Northumberland, North Yorkshire, Wales (Powys), Staffordshire and Yorkshire. Animal movements prior to the imposition of the country-wide ban on movements imposed on February 23 were responsible for the initial introduction of infection in 9 of these areas. Local spread or fomites were suspected to be responsible for the remaining introductions.

The epidemic spread to a large scale and was thought to be prolonged for several reasons. First, the delay between the estimated introduction of disease and its notification and discovery allowed significant spread through animal movements. The epidemic occurred primarily in sheep, and the clinical detection of disease in sheep was difficult. The initial introduction of the virus coincided with one of the annual peaks of sheep movements through markets. Other sheep management practices, such as upland and lowland movement, grouping or concentration of animals at certain times, and the movement of people for such things as shearing contributed to the outbreak.

Control and eradication of the epidemic was achieved through a stamping-out policy. As mentioned previously, national animal movement controls were initially imposed on February 23, 2001. All susceptible species were slaughtered on infected premises, and control measures as laid down in EU legislation were applied. Preventive slaughter was done on contiguous premises and any premises identified as dangerous contacts or otherwise at risk. A total of approximately 6 million animals were slaughtered over the course of the epidemic: 4 million for eradication purposes, and an additional 2 million for animal welfare reasons.

The following table provides the total number of holdings where animals were slaughtered, either because of infection, contact or suspicion, through the course of the epidemic.

	<b>FMD confirmed</b>	<b>Dangerous contacts/ Contiguous premises</b>	<b>Slaughter on suspicion</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>No. of holdings</b>	2,026	7,499	257	9,782
<b>No. of animals slaughtered:</b>				
<b>Cattle</b>	304,000	278,000	13,000	595,000
<b>Sheep</b>	903,000	2,282,000	109,000	3,294,000
<b>Pigs</b>	20,000	120,000	2,000	142,000
<b>Goats</b>	900	1,000	300	2,200
<b>Total no. animals</b>	1,227,900	2,681,000	124,300	4,033,200

### Control measures:

Control measures were applied as laid down in Community legislation, specifically Directive 85/511/EEC. The response was organized and overseen by DEFRA, through the National Disease Control Center (NDCC) located at headquarters in London. Disease control responsibility in the field was handled through State Veterinary Service (SVS) staff in Local Disease Control Centers (LDCC). As the epidemic spread and additional help was needed, private veterinary practitioners and veterinarians from overseas were appointed as Temporary Veterinary Inspectors to augment the local SVS staff. Personnel from other government organizations, including military personnel, were also involved in the response effort.

A suspected case of disease would be initially reported to the LDCC, either by the producer, a practitioner, or as part of ongoing tracing or patrol efforts. A veterinary inspector, who immediately imposed "Form A" movement restrictions, then visited the premises. These prevented the movement of animals, animal products, people, vehicles, feed, and waste material. Based on the clinical findings, history, and discussions between the veterinarian, the LDCC, and NDCC, a decision was made as to whether the premises was infected. Initially, the presence of disease was only confirmed through laboratory results. Subsequently local veterinary staff was authorized to diagnose disease based strictly on clinical signs, before receiving the laboratory results. A premises could be defined as an infected premises (IP) based on clinical signs by the local veterinary inspector, or could be slaughtered on suspicion (SOS). In the case of an SOS premises, if disease was confirmed via laboratory results after slaughter, the premises was subsequently defined as an IP with the concurrent control zones applied. If the decision was that no FMD infection was apparent on the premises, the initial "Form A" restrictions were lifted. A target time of 2 hours was established from the initial phone call to when a decision was made.

A premises was declared infected once the diagnosis of FMD is made. All susceptible livestock on an IP were slaughtered, and the carcasses disposed of by burial, incineration, or rendering. A target time of 24 hours was set for the slaughter of animals on an IP, starting from the time suspicion was reported to the LDCC. All susceptible species on contiguous premises were slaughtered. A target time of 48 hours was set for the slaughter of contiguous premises.

In one outbreak area – specifically part of Cumbria in England and the adjacent county of Dumfries & Galloway in Scotland, the compulsory slaughter of all sheep within a 3-km radius of IP's within defined areas was completed. This was due to concerns that the presence of extensive unapparent disease in sheep might spread to cattle in the area.

Tracings were immediately started from any known movements off an IP prior to confirmation of disease. Dangerous contacts were defined as any of the following: contiguous premises; animal movements or contact; the movement of personnel, equipment or feed; suspected location within a plume of virus spread; and other

epidemiological reasons. There were approximately 5,000 premises considered as dangerous contacts. Approximately 400 of these were actually Infected Premises – i.e., approximately 20% of IP's initially were investigated as dangerous contacts.

After slaughter of animals on an IP, the premises was cleaned and disinfected in two stages. A preliminary or initial C&D was completed to eliminate surface virus. The premises was then evaluated and a schedule or tender was put out for local contractors to bid on the complete or final C&D job. A team of C&D officers supervised the contractors and inspected the facility afterwards. There was no mandatory requirement to complete the final C&D. However, in such cases restrictions remained in place for at least 12 months.

An Infected Area with a radius of at least 10 km was established around each IP. This included a protection zone of 3 km and surveillance zone of 10 km. All holdings within the protection zone were placed under official Form D movement restrictions. Patrols were required to visit all premises in the Infected Area. A total of at least 7 visits were required – one within 48 hours after diagnosis of an IP. A total of 4 visits were made the first week, 2 visits during the second week, and the final visit 21 days after an IP was declared.

At a later stage in the epidemic, stricter biosecurity controls were imposed in certain areas. These were Restricted Infected Areas (RIAs), also known as “blue box” controls. The following controls were imposed in an RIA:

- no movement of animal onto and off farms except under license to slaughter for human consumption or under the Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme;
- all vehicles required to be cleaned and disinfected before entering and when leaving farms;
- movement of feed and milk on or off farms must be licensed; silage vehicles must have specific licenses; slurry discharge by jet or spray only allowed under license;
- all milk tankers operating must be dedicated to use in the RIA, accompanied by an official to ensure C&D requirements met;
- official C&D stations established with stickers used to indicate completion of C&D;
- livestock farms required to maintain footbaths at every exit;
- personnel moving on and off farms required to leave clothing and footwear used when handling susceptible species;
- regular patrols by local authority officials and police instituted to ensure compliance.

As mentioned previously, restrictions on the movement of livestock throughout Great Britain were initially imposed on February 23, 2001. This was done through the designation of the entire country as a Controlled Area. This prohibited the movement of all farmed livestock throughout Great Britain, including a ban on animal gatherings such as markets or shows. These controls were in addition to the specific movement controls

applied in an Infected Area. Eventually, the country was categorized into 3 FMD risk areas for purposes of movement controls:

- Provisionally free areas - there had never been an outbreak of FMD
- At risk areas – outbreaks occurred but had been stamped out and Infected Area restrictions had been lifted
- Infected Areas – outbreaks occurred and Infected Area movement restrictions still in place.

Movements were allowed from low risk to high risk areas under official controls. Movements in the reverse direction were not allowed until June 21 when limited movements of cattle and pigs were allowed from at risk areas to provisionally free areas under certain conditions.

Movements were allowed under official control and in accordance with a license for such things as movement to slaughter; repeated movements within holdings for management purposes; long distance movements for welfare reasons under certain conditions; movement to common grazing or gathering licenses. The total number of licenses issued for various types of movements until September 30 are summarized in the following table. A total of 250,407 inspections were completed in association with movements for welfare reasons, with no cases of FMD identified as a result of these inspections.

Type of license	No. licenses issued			No. subject to Veterinary inspection
	England	Wales	Scotland	
Local movement	87,746	27,823	7,472	123,041
Longer distance	61,921	20,679	8,247	90,847
Specific movement	N/A	N/A	20,838	20,838
Animal treatment	137	83	45	265
Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme	9,649	4,994	773	15,366
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>159,453</b>	<b>53,579</b>	<b>37,375</b>	<b>250,407</b>

Beginning on October 1, 2001, movement controls throughout the country were revised in line with the improved disease situation. The previous definitions of areas – provisionally free, at risk, or infected – were replaced and existing administrative boundaries were used to classify areas. Infected Area restrictions continued to apply as well as any additional RIA restrictions still in place. Counties were classified as follows:

- FMD free counties:
  - o No outbreaks for 3 months, and
  - o Serological surveillance complete in both 3 km protection zone and 10 km surveillance zone, and
  - o All “at-risk” flocks resolved (destroyed or tested negative)
- FMD at risk counties:
  - o No outbreaks for the past 30 days and entirely outside an existing IA, and

- Serological surveillance completed in 3 km protection zones, and
- Serological surveillance in 10 km surveillance zones not completed and “at-risk” flocks not yet resolved.
- FMD high risk counties:
  - Outbreaks have occurred in the past 30 days, or
  - Serological surveillance in 3 km protection zones not complete, and
  - Serological surveillance in 10 km surveillance zones not complete, and
  - “at-risk” flocks not yet resolved.

Movement controls based on these classifications were in place at the time of the site visit, and are summarized as follows:

Farm to farm movements	Cattle	Pigs	Sheep
FC to another FC and within the same FC	Permitted	Permitted	Permitted
FC to AR	Permitted	Permitted	Permitted
FC to HR	Not permitted	Not permitted**	Not permitted
FC/AC/HR to IA/RIA	Not permitted	Not permitted	Not permitted
AR to another AR and within the same AR	Permitted	Permitted	Permitted*
AR to FC	Not permitted	Not permitted	Not permitted
AR to HR	Not permitted	Not permitted	Not permitted
HR within the same HR	Permitted	Permitted	Permitted
HR to a different HR	Not permitted	Not permitted	Not permitted
HR to AR/FC	Not permitted	Not permitted	Not permitted

FC = FMD Free county; AR = FMD At-risk county; HR = FMD high risk county; IA/RIA = Infected Area or Restricted Infected Area.

\* = only from serologically tested flock; rams must be individually tested

\*\* = individually identified pigs may make one move per 3 monthly period to a HR but not to an IA

Additional details and specifics about the movement restrictions are included in the OIE report.

Restocking policy:

Restocking was allowed after at least 21 days had elapsed from the completion of the final C&D. Known negative or sentinel animals were allowed to be introduced, at a level of 25% of the population numbers that were previously present. These sentinel animals were inspected and approved prior to movement onto the premises. They were clinically examined once a week for 4 weeks after introduction. At least 28 days after introduction, a thorough clinical examination was done on all animals. Sheep and goats were

serologically sampled at a 95/5 rate – i.e., 95% confidence of detecting disease present at a prevalence of 5%. Restrictions were lifted following receipt of negative results from this final sampling.

If no restocking was done, restrictions remained in place on a premises for a period of 4 months after the completion of the final C&D. As mentioned previously, if no final C&D was completed, restrictions remain in place for a period of 12 months.

Serological surveillance:

Serological surveillance was carried out to determine the end of the outbreak. In general, the surveillance could be divided into 3 groups.

(1) Protection zone (3-km protection zone around an IP):

Serological (and clinical) surveillance was done of all flocks, and of each management group of sheep and/or goats, within the 3 km protection zones using a protocol to detect a 5% prevalence with 95% confidence. This survey was not started until at least 21 days after preliminary C&D was completed on the IP.

(2) Surveillance zone (3-10 km surveillance zone around an IP):

Serological (and clinical) surveillance was done on random samples of holdings in the surveillance zones, with the number of holdings sampled being that required to detect 2% holdings with seropositive sheep with 95% confidence. On each of the selected holdings, a sampling protocol to detect with 95% confidence a 5% prevalence of infection on the holding was followed. Where the surveillance zones formed a single large confluent area due to the high number of IP's, the zone was divided into sectors. Each sector comprised a sampling frame of approximately 200 flocks with sheep and/or goats. This surveillance was not started until at least 21 days after preliminary C&D was completed on any IP within 10 km. In addition, this was usually started only after the protection zone surveillance was completed.

(3) Additional serosurveillance in 7 counties: Due to the number of outbreaks that had occurred in the 7 counties identified earlier, additional sampling was carried out in these counties. In these areas, sampling zones were created – either strips or circles, depending on the county. Within these sampling zones, flocks were selected at random from a list frame. In addition to these random stratified samples, attention was paid to farms where sheep had no contact with other species. If a selected farm had multiple management groups, all groups were sampled even if they were managed completely separately.

The following summarizes the surveillance in the most affected counties in England and Wales:

County	No flocks sampled	Percentage	No. seropositive	No. virus positive
Devon	4407	88%	13	1
Cumbria	2333	100%	10	1
No. Yorkshire	3389	95%	6	0
Northumberland	1489	95%	8	0

Durham	2061	95%	1	0
Powys	2907	92%	2	0
TOTAL	16862		40	2

The county of Dumfries & Galloway in Scotland was not included in this table. In this county, animals were slaughtered on 456 premises that were either IP's, contiguous premises, dangerous contacts or slaughtered on suspicion. In addition, due to concern about spread as described previously, sheep on an additional 967 premises within the surveillance zones were preventively killed. Thus, the sheep and goat population in this area had been considerably depleted prior to beginning serological surveillance. However, a total of 720 premises either in the affected counties or on premises in Northern Scotland with links to premises in the affected areas were sampled with no positive results.

There were 2 flocks identified as virus positive in this surveillance. In Devon, one flock included in protection zone testing was identified as virus positive. This flock was identified as an IP and depopulated on June 17, 2001. This was the last infected flock in this county. In Cumbria, the virus positive flock was also located in the protection zone testing. It also was identified as an IP and depopulated. Restrictions as previously described for IP's, including the establishment of protection and surveillance zones with subsequent surveillance requirements, applied to these premises.

In general, the following procedures were followed if seropositive animals were found during this surveillance. When seropositive animals were found in any management group, the entire group was resampled 7 days later, after each animal in the group had been individually identified. If only one animal was seropositive after this rebleeding, only that animal was slaughtered. If more than one animal was seropositive after rebleeding, the entire management group was slaughtered. In general, in holdings where more than one animal was seropositive, then any holding with sheep and/or goats within 3 km of the seropositive holding that had not already been tested, was also tested.

Seropositive animals were probanged prior to slaughter and the probang samples were sent to IAH Pirbright for virus isolation. If virus was found, the holding was confirmed as an IP and all the procedures previously described were applied. If virus was not isolated, the holding was classified as a "dangerous contact" and the premises had to undergo C&D before restocking.

The following table summarizes all of the surveillance results through January 14, 2002, with a total of 3,073,500 SPcELISA tests completed. From this sampling, virus was isolated in 2 flocks. These are the same 2 flocks identified and discussed previously.

Reason for testing	No. of farms tested	No. of adults on farms	No. of samples tested	Samples positive	% sero-positive	No of flocks sero-positive	% of flocks sero-positive
3 km protection zone	10,219	1,838,920	771,308	404	0.05	31	0.30
Epidemiology	2,364	630,912	257,924	806	0.31	73	3.09
3-10 km surveillance zone	11,799	2,695,940	1,101,814	167	0.02	13	0.11
Pre-movement	4,190	1,528,262	585,333	69	0.01	2	0.05
Restocking	800	153,293	105,651	1	0.00	0	1.80
Other	2,811	619,764	251,470	953	0.27		
Total	32,183	7,467,091	3,073,500	2,400	0.08		

Seropositive flocks found after September 30, 2001:

A total of 21 flocks with seropositive sheep and/or goats were identified after September 30. These were identified in Cumbria (6), Devon (2), Durham (1), Lancashire (1), North Yorkshire (5), Northumberland (5) and Monmouthshire (1). Eight of these flocks were identified in protection zone testing, 11 in surveillance zone testing, and 2 as part of required pre-movement testing.

In the protection zone testing done from September 30 – January 10 2002, a total of 8 of 569 flocks tested had seropositive sheep. If only 1 or 2 animals in a flock were seropositive (after retesting as previously described), in general only the seropositive sheep were slaughtered in the absence of any other evidence of infection. Four of the 8 protection zone flocks that had seropositive animals fell into this category. In the remaining 4 flocks, the entire management group was slaughtered. No virus was isolated from any of the flocks.

In the surveillance zone testing done in the same time frame, a total of 11 of 5,893 flocks tested had seropositive sheep. The same principles were followed and the entire management group was slaughtered in 8 flocks and only individual seropositive sheep slaughtered in the remaining 3 flocks. No virus was isolated from any of the flocks.

Two flocks (1 in Northumberland and 1 in North Yorkshire) had seropositive sheep identified as part of pre-movement testing requirements. These 2 flocks were out of a total of 4,190 flocks tested. The North Yorkshire flock was slaughtered because seropositive sheep were found in a majority of management groups. In the Northumberland flock, only the seropositive sheep were slaughtered. No virus was isolated from either flock.

#### Serological tests used:

A solid phase competitive ELISA (SPcELISA) was used in the serological survey. Inconclusive results were retested by the virus neutralization test (VNT). The SPcELISA was used as a screening test. A positive results was one giving 70% or more inhibition; an inconclusive result gave 60-69% inhibition; and a negative result gave less than 60% inhibition.

If all of the results from a given flock or management group were negative, it was reported as negative. If 5 or less samples from a management group were positive by SPcELISA, these samples were retested with the VNT. If a sample gave a positive VNT result, the sample was reported as positive.

If 6 or more samples from a management group were SPcELISA positive, the SPcELISA was repeated on those samples. If they remained SPcELISA positive, they were reported as serologically positive. If the repeated samples were negative or inconclusive on the SPcELISA, they were subjected to a VNT. The VNT results were then listed as the final result, either positive or negative.

The SPcELISA was developed at Pirbright and validated through the course of this epidemic. The results have been documented and submitted to OIE for recognition of this test in the Manual of Diagnostic Standards. The test was evaluated for specificity by using known negative sera. A cut off point of 60% inhibition was selected, to maximize the sensitivity of the test, and the specificity for each species was reported as listed in the following table. The same negative samples tested in the VNT gave a test specificity of 100% for all species.

Species	Sera tested	Specificity and 95% confidence limits
Ovine	3030	99.80% (99.57 - 99.93)
Bovine	1418	100.00% (99.40 - 100.00)
Porcine	1494	100.00% (99.40 – 100.00)

The sensitivity of the test was evaluated using known positive sera collected sequentially from 10 experimentally infected sheep. The test detected seroconversion at 8 days or more post-infection. A sensitivity of 100% (69.2 – 100.00%) was reported at 95% confidence limits.

#### Import controls:

Import controls in Great Britain are maintained as laid down in harmonized Community legislation. In general, imports of animal products are only allowed from approved countries and approved establishments with certification. Animals or products from third countries may only enter at defined and recognized border inspection posts. Documentary checks and identity checks are done on all consignments, and the physical inspection requirements vary, depending on the product and the country of origin.

Inspections at ports are done by official veterinarians, either DEFRA employees or other officials appointed and approved by DEFRA. Port veterinarians inspecting live animals are DEFRA employees. Inspections at ports that accept products for human consumption are done by employees of Port Health. At those ports which don't accept products for human consumption, inspection is done by DEFRA employees. All port activities are audited by three oversight bodies: the UK Food Standards Agency, UK DEFRA, and the European Commission's Food and Veterinary Office (FVO).

Community legislation prohibits the entry of live animals susceptible to FMD from those countries that either vaccinate or which have not been free of FMD for 2 years. There is no facility for post-entry quarantine in the Community.

As a result of concerns expressed over this outbreak and the previous outbreak of classical swine fever in East Anglia, DEFRA is examining methods to change their import controls. They are considering several avenues to deal with passenger baggage and personal imports. Currently, DEFRA does not have the authority to open passenger bags on suspicion – they must rely on Customs authority to do this. This is one avenue for change that is being explored. Other options under consideration include dog teams and x-ray technology.

International waste – both airline and maritime – is controlled. This waste is picked up by licensed contractors and incinerated or buried in a landfill.

The feeding of swill to swine has been completely banned in the UK.

#### Conclusions:

At the conclusion of the site review site review team members from the United States reached the following conclusions by consensus:

1. Great Britain had implemented adequate surveillance and control measures to eradicate FMD.
2. Great Britain had maintained FMD-free for 3 months, thereby meeting OIE criteria for reinstatement of FMD-free status.
3. DEFRA had addressed the issues of swill feeding, control of international waste, and illegal imports adequately, with the caveat that all risk from these areas can never be completely mitigated.
4. Because the magnitude of the outbreak was so great and its effects were so devastating to the United Kingdom, DEFRA has developed an increased level of sensitivity and an enhanced level of awareness of the potential for disease incursions. Relevant to this, two suspect cases were reported to international trading partners after the outbreak was controlled. These were detected and reported rapidly, and DEFRA quickly confirmed that neither case was FMD.
5. The risk of exporting FMD-affected animals and products from Great Britain is low.