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Lisbon, February 24, 2000

Subject: Portuguese ASF Situation & US Hog Ear Import Requirements

Dr. Malik,


Thank you for your E-mail of February 23.

Regarding Portugal's ASF situation, please be advised that our office has received this week a fax-message from the local veterinary authorities with an update on the AFS situation in Portugal, which I am also faxing with this letter.

In joint letter sent with ASF update, the General Vet Directorate raised the issue that the APHIS pig ear import requirements "... are not in conformity with Portugal's sanitary statute relative to African Swine Fever", and "... do not have technical grounds based on risk assessment". In this context, the GVD wishes to convey to APHIS the epidemiological information derived from the Nov. 15.99 ASF outbreak in "Aldela dos Fernandes" in Almodôvar, and the EU Standing Veterinary Decision concerning Portugal (see annex). Finally, the GVD expresses wish that the US sanitary authorities take into consideration the restrictions applied to Portugal by the other 14 EU Member States, and enforce similar measures to trade between both countries.


If any of this produces any effects on the U.S. Pig Ear import requirements, please let me know. If you need more information on the ASF situation in Portugal, please also let me know.

Best Regards,




Leonor Ramos.

*Dr. Colgrane  
I received this information  
from our embassy in Portugal  
this is FYI. May be  
it is of some use to Regionalization  
staff.  
Masoud.*



ABATES ZONA DE 3 KM (SLAUGHTER - 3 KM ZONE)



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**Information Related to the outbreak  
of African Swine Fever in Aldeia  
Dos Fernandes – Almodôvar –  
(ZIS n.º 20) - Alentejo – Portugal**

Portugal was declared free of ASF in March 1993 by Commission Decision, after the disease introduction in our country in 1956.

On the 5th of November 1999 a suspicion of ASF was made in a pig farm located in Aldeia dos Fernandes – Almodôvar – Alentejo.

Immediate measures were taken in order to eradicate the disease and prevent infection to extend to other pigs herds.

**A - Specific Measures on the Protection and  
Surveillance Zones**

1. – On the basis of the detection of ASF antibodies last 9th of November 1999 at the suspicious farm the measures taken were:
  - a) Depopulation of the herd, cleaning and disinfection.
  - b) Protection and Surveillance Zones of 3 and 10 Kms around the suspicious farm, with standstill of all pigs on the herds, followed by clinical inspection performed by the Veterinary Services.
2. – After the confirmation of the outbreak on the 15th of November by virus isolation, according to D. Law n.º 39.209 stating the legal basis for compulsory notifiable diseases, the following measures were implemented:



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- a) Protection Zone of 3 Km around the outbreak with the slaughter of all swine animals (preventive slaughter) existing in all the pig herds, with collection of blood and samples for the purpose of ASF diagnosis.
- b) Surveillance Zone on the following area: ZIS n.º 19 – Barrancos, Mértola, Moura and Serpa; ZIS n.º 20 – Aljustrel, Almodovar, Alvito, Beja, Castro Verde, Cuba, Ferreira do Alentejo, Ourique and Vidigueira; Zis n.º 23 – Loulé, Alcoutim and Silves.
- c) On the Protection and Surveillance Zone a standstill of all Swine is in force.
- d) On the Surveillance Zone a clinical inspection is been performed in all pig herds followed by serological control for the purpose of ASF diagnosis.
- e) An Epidemiological inquiry is been performed on the infected herd in order to identify the origin of infection. A tracing back and on investigation is in place.
- f) The area involved in the Protection and Surveillance Zones is about 14.000 SQ Km.

### **B - Protective measures taken in order to control the disease and prevent infection extending to other pig herds**

1. - Those measures are performed and supervised by the Veterinarian services, at national, regional and local level, with the collaboration of "Guarda Nacional Republicana" and "Inspeção Geral das Actividades Económicas".
2. - Further measures were taken concerning movement of pigs between the south and north of Tagus river, including intracomunity trade.
  - No animals are allowed to move from the south to the north of Tagus river, unless for immediately slaughter with "Guia Sanitária de Trânsito" issued by the Veterinarian Services.
  - Suspension on the issue of Animal Health Certificates for intracomunity trade of live pigs.



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## C - Decisions of European Commission related to ASF in Portugal and Surveillance Programme

A Mission of the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) was in Portugal from 22 - 23 th November 1999 in order to evaluate the outbreak of ASF and the measures taken by the Portuguese Veterinary Services (Annex 1).

A first Decision was approved on the Standing Veterinary Committee held in Brussels on the 24/11/99 (Annex 2) and following the epidemiological evolution of the disease a second Decision was taken on the 12.1.00 (Annex 3).

The measures contained in the Commission Decision (Annex 3) and the Surveillance Programme (Annex 4) are in force in all pig herds located on the Regions of Alentejo and Algarve.

In all the remaining regions of mainland Portugal, (Entre Douro e Minho, Trás-os-Montes, Beira Litoral, Beira Interior and Ribatejo e Oeste), Azores and Madeira there is no restriction on pig movements.

On the basis of the Surveillance Program several thousands of pigs were sampled and farms were inspected. No antibodies or virus were detected.

## D - Epidemiological data

### 1 - Infected farm

#### • Outbreak n.º 1/99

- Date of suspicion - 5.11.99
- Samples sent to the Lab - 5.11.99
- Date of Lab results - 9.11.99 (Elisa positive for Antibodies)
- Date of slaughter and destruction - 11 and 12.11.99
- Date of virus isolation - 15 and 17.11.99
- Date of disinfection - 20.11.99

**Note:** Ticks collected at the farm on 19.11.99



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## 2 - Protection Zone

- Number of Herds – 16 \*
- Number of Slaughtered animals – 960
- N.º of Herds with ASF antibodies – 4
- N.º of Herds with virus isolation – 2
- Virus isolation only on outbreak 1/99

\* Including the outbreak (with 2 herds) and 2 contact farms.

## 3 - SAMPLING IN ABATTOIRS AND PRE-MOVEMENT

| REGION   | N.º OF SAMPLES | N.º OF HERD | RESULTS    |       |
|----------|----------------|-------------|------------|-------|
|          |                |             | Antibodies | Virus |
| ALENTEJO | 29.385         | 437         | 0          | 0     |
| ALGARVE  | 3.579          | 57.         | 0          | 0     |



#### 4 - SAMPLING IN THE SURVEILLANCE ZONE

| <u>N.º OF<br/>SAMPLES</u> | <u>N.º OF<br/>HERDS</u> | <u>RESULTS</u>    |              |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
|                           |                         | <u>Antibodies</u> | <u>Virus</u> |
| 8.135                     | 159                     | 0                 | 0            |

#### 5 - HERDS WITH VIRUS ISOLATION

| <u>N.º OF<br/>HERDS</u> | <u>LOCALIZATION</u> | <u>SITUATION<br/>AT<br/>PRESENT</u> | <u>REMARKS</u>       |
|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 2                       | Protection Zone     | No pigs after<br>depopulation       | Outbreak n.º<br>1/99 |

- Virus characterisation - Laboratorial studies not yet finished
- Ticks collected - Laboratorial studies not yet finish



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**6 - INSPECTION ON PIG FARMS**

| <b>N.º OF FARMS INSPECTED</b> | <b>INFORMATION</b>  |
|-------------------------------|---|
| 542                           | Done by official veterinarians to see the health status of pigs with elaboration of Epidemiological inquiries |

**7 - HERDS WITH ANTIBODIES OF A.S.F.**

| <b><u>N.º OF HERDS</u></b> | <b>LOCALIZATION</b>                          | <b>SITUATION AT PRESENT</b> | <b>REMARKS</b>  |
|----------------------------|--|-----------------------------|---|
| 4                          | Protection Zone - 3<br>Surveillance Zone - 1 | No pigs after depopulation  | Through the I.E. it was found animal and human contact with the outbreak farm |



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**8 - SAMPLING OF THE ALENTEJANO BREED OF PIGS**

| <u>N.º OF<br/>SAMPLES</u> | <u>N.º OF<br/>HERDS</u> | <u>RESULTS</u>    |              |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
|                           |                         | <u>Antibodies</u> | <u>Virus</u> |
| 1.974                     | 40                      | 0                 | 0            |

**9 - SAMPLING OF WILD BOARS**

(October, November, December, 1999)

| <u>REGION</u>   | <u>N.º OF<br/>SAMPLES</u> | <u>RESULTS</u>    |              |
|-----------------|---------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
|                 |                           | <u>Antibodies</u> | <u>Virus</u> |
| <u>ALENTEJO</u> | 530                       | 0                 | 0            |
| <u>ALGARVE</u>  | 38                        | 0                 | 0            |



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**10 - CONCLUSIONS**

The outbreak was controlled, the disease eradicated and the measures to prevent disease to other pigs herds successfully implemented.

ANNEX 1



EUROPEAN COMMISSION  
HEALTH & CONSUMER PROTECTION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL

Directorate D - Food and Veterinary Office

DG(SANCO)/1244/1999 - MR draft

DRAFT REPORT OF A MISSION  
CARRIED OUT IN PORTUGAL  
FROM 22 to 23 NOVEMBER 1999  
CONCERNING AN OUTBREAK OF AFRICAN SWINE FEVER

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The mission took place in Portugal from 22 to 23 November 1999. The mission team comprised 2 inspectors from the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO), and 3 Member State experts.

The mission was an urgent mission in response to an outbreak of African Swine Fever (ASF).

The inspection team was accompanied during the whole mission by a representative from the central competent authority (Portuguese Veterinary Service).

An opening meeting was held on 22 November 1999 with the central competent authority, and the regional authority. At this meeting, the objectives of, and itinerary for, the mission were confirmed by the inspection team.

## 2. OBJECTIVES OF THE MISSION

The objective of the mission was to inspect the measures taken by the Portuguese Competent Authority and to examine the epidemiological situation in relation to the current outbreak. This was the first mission undertaken to Portugal concerning African Swine Fever since 1996.

In pursuit of this objective, the following sites were visited:

| COMPETENT AUTHORITY VISITS |          | Comments |
|----------------------------|----------|----------|
| Competent authority        | Central  |          |
|                            | Regional |          |

| LABORATORY VISITS | Comments |
|-------------------|----------|
| Central/reference |          |

| LIVE ANIMAL CONTROL SITES | Comments |
|---------------------------|----------|
| Farms                     |          |
| Other sites (specify)     |          |
| Burial site               |          |

## 3. LEGAL BASIS FOR MISSION

The mission was carried out under the general provisions of Community legislation and, in particular:

- Commission Decision 98/139/EC of 4 February 1998 laying down certain detailed rules concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the veterinary field by Commission experts in the Member States.
- Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the completion of the internal market.

- Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market.
- Council Directive 93/119/EEC of 11 December 1993 on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing.

#### 4. BACKGROUND

##### 4.1. History

The first outbreak of ASF in Portugal occurred in 1957 in a herd located near Lisbon. After the epidemiological inquiry performed at the time, the most probable source of infection was swill feeding with contaminated waste food from international flights (Africa). The disease became enzootic in 1960 despite the initial measures taken by the Veterinary Services, with outbreaks occurring and the quick spread of the disease throughout the country. After the disease became enzootic the veterinary services carried out measures in order to control the diseases. In 1987 an eradication programme, approved by Commission Decision, was implemented and in March 1993 Portugal was declared free from ASF. However, in August 1993, some outbreaks in Alentejo led to a regionalization of the country. In December 1994, Portugal regained ASF free status and a surveillance programme was put in place and financed by the Commission until December 1996.

##### 4.2. Summary of previous mission results

The last FVO mission to Portugal on ASF was in 1996 (VI/8086/96). With regard to the epidemiological situation, the mission concluded that:

- The situation in respect of ASF in Alentejo appeared satisfactory
- The serological monitoring programme in place since the last outbreak failed to reveal any serological evidence of diseases, nor has there been any isolation of ASF virus in 1994-1996
- The existing monitoring programme in both wild boars and domestic pigs should be continued
- No evidence was presented to support the view that wild boar or the tick *Ornithodoros erraticus* have played a significant part in the spread or maintenance of the disease in recent years.

#### 5. MAIN FINDINGS

##### 5.1. Surveillance since 1996

During the mission, the Portuguese Competent Authority explained that serological surveillance had been continued after expiry of community financial contribution to the surveillance programme - on commercial pigs at slaughterhouses, on small holders pigs and on wild boars. The team

received the data of this surveillance following discussion in the SVC on 25 November 1999: 4,899 samples in 1996, 9,677 samples in 1997 and 8,599 in 1998, all with negative results.

### 5.2. Evolution of the outbreak and action taken by competent authority

- Friday, 5 November: a private veterinarian suspected African Swine Fever based on autopsy of 2 dead pigs in the Alentejo region and sent material to the National Institute in Lisbon for laboratory examination.
- Monday, 8 November: the local official veterinarian visited the farm and put it under restrictions.
- Tuesday, 9 November: the Institute reported detection of antibodies in the material received.
- Thursday, 11 November and Friday, 12 November: the suspect farm and a neighbouring farm - 150 m away - regarded as an epidemiological unit due to broken fence, were depopulated and a 3 km protection zone was established around the suspect farm.
- Saturday, 13 November: preventive slaughter of all pigs in the protection zone was initiated and completed by 18 November. (897 pigs from 99 owners)
- Monday, 15 November: the Institute reported isolation of African swine fever virus in material from the suspect farm and the outbreak was notified to the Commission. One contact farm 5 km away (same owner) was depopulated.
- Tuesday, 16 November: a 10 km surveillance zone was established. Standstill was introduced in a restricted area of 14.000 km<sup>2</sup> (13 municipalities in Alentejo and 3 municipalities in Algarve).
- Thursday, 18 November: clinical inspection and blood sampling of pigs in all holdings in the surveillance zone was initiated - expected to be completed by Friday, 26 November. Furthermore, measures were also taken on the movement live animals between the south and north of the Tagus river: no animals could leave the area south of the Tagus river, outside of the restricted area, unless destined for immediate slaughter with "Guia Sanitária de Trânsito" issued by the Veterinary Services. Issuing of Animal Health Certificates for intra-Community trade was suspended.

### 5.3. Pig husbandry in the area

The zone is dominated by familial non-commercial type of pig husbandry. The pigs reared belong to the Black Alentejano breed of pig. These pigs are mostly free-range reared, and are used for typical traditional products and have a market value higher than commercial "white pigs".

In total, 960 pigs have been slaughtered. The ownership is spread between 17 epidemiological units: 15 farms and 2 villages. Three of the farms kept

260, 110 and 98 pigs respectively, the other 12 farms kept between 2 and 40 pigs. In the villages concerned almost every family owned an average of 2 fattening pigs, prepared for Christmas. These pigs were kept on communal pastures and housed in a "communal piggery" on the outskirts of each village.

Breeding pigs are marked by the breeding association.

#### 5.4. Outbreak farm

The mission team visited the farm where the first outbreak was identified, as well as the adjacent farm.

The holding is an old stone pigsty, probably more than 100 years old and is situated in the middle of a field with no surrounding vegetation.

#### 5.5. Epidemiological enquiry

- Tracing back and forward from the original outbreak farm has not been possible because there is no obligation in Portugal for small holders to keep a farm register or a movement of animals register. However, the local authorities did find relevant epidemiological links between the different farms with positive serological results, by interrogating the owner of the diseased pigs as well as other pig owners.
- The local authority had kept easily accessible records and data of the affected farm. This allowed them to ascertain that the affected farm had an outbreak in 1987, and was sampled in the framework of random sampling in 1991, with negative results. They also established that the affected farm did not keep any pigs in 1995 and 1996 and re-population of the farm commenced in 1997.
- The competent authority found that 2 people in the village had commercial links with affected countries in Africa. This is currently under investigation.
- The genotyping of the virus has not yet been carried out.
- A team from the Parasitology department went to collect ticks from the affected holdings. According to preliminary information, there was a significant tick population in the outbreak farm and none in the contact farm. Information on the number of ticks and virus presence was not yet available at the time of the mission. \*

#### 5.6. Serological survey in the 10 km area

As laid down in the existing contingency plan, the competent authority set up 7 teams, each with one veterinarian and 2 technicians, to visit each farm in the area and collect blood samples from every adult animal. By the end of the second week since the start of the investigation, the teams would have visited 400 farms and collected blood from 4,000 pigs.

The inspection team visited a farm where one of the teams was working. The working practices were found to be adequate.

An epidemiological questionnaire is completed for each farm visited.

#### 5.7. Standstill and Clinical surveillance in the 14,000 Km<sup>2</sup> area

The Portuguese established a standstill on a zone of about 14,000 km<sup>2</sup>, including part of the Alentejo and Algarve regions, and implemented a clinical survey.

Thirteen teams were formed to visit the farm, performing clinical examinations and taking temperatures of a percentage of pigs.

#### 5.8. Restriction of movement between the north and the south of the country

At the request of the Spanish authorities, the Portuguese authorities put a stop to the movement of pigs from the south to the north of the Tagus river, except for pigs destined for immediate slaughter. There are only 7 bridges which cross the river so it is a very easy border to control.

#### 5.9. Laboratory service

The Central Veterinary Laboratory, in Lisbon, is in charge of ASF.

The laboratory started working without delay as soon as the samples arrived.

The laboratory results obtained, up until the day of the meeting, had revealed antibodies in pigs from 2 farms, in addition to the infected farm(s), in the protection zone and in pigs from the contact farm (same owner) in the surveillance zone. One of the 2 holdings in the protection zone had received a boar for service from the infected farm, while there had been human contact with the other farm.

The laboratory keeps records which have mostly an internal value, for example, in the summarising table, the date of arrival of samples is recorded instead of the date of sampling. The type of pig (fattening, breeding pig, sow etc.), was not reported in the table presenting the data.

#### 5.10. Stamping out and destruction

The competent authority informed the team that the pigs were "killed" on the spot by captive bolt pistols, without subsequent bleeding and further verification that death had occurred; and were transported to the burial site (usually situated on the farm). Animals were incinerated and buried.

### 6. CONCLUSIONS

Since 1996, surveillance activities have been continuously carried out in the affected area, in respect of African Swine Fever. The mission team was unable to evaluate the surveillance plan and significance of its results, due to the short amount of time available.

The Portuguese authorities acted rapidly as far as surveillance and protection measures are concerned.

The laboratory was able to give a rapid and adequate response to the presence of a virus and in processing the samples.

The virus type has not yet been identified.

It is not possible at present to attempt to identify the origin nor the extent of the infection, but the hypothesis of viral persistence in either pigs or ticks or at the premises seems the most likely explanation.

The lack of a legal requirement for small-scale Portuguese farmers to maintain a farm register or movement of animals register risks making attempts to investigate disease outbreaks more difficult.

Stamping out and destruction were adequately carried out, considering the circumstances. However, the killing of pigs was not carried out in compliance with Article 3 and Article 5 Paragraph 3, Annex C Chapter II first sentence, Annex D Paragraph 1 and 2 and Annex E of Council Directive 93/119/EC, as the stunning of pigs was not followed by the appropriate measures of killing the animals as soon as possible thereafter, and in any event before they regained consciousness.

## 7. RECOMMENDATIONS

### 7.1. To the competent authorities of Portugal

- To pursue serological and clinical surveys in order to define the extent of the infection.
- To genotype the virus.
- To continue epidemiological inquiries into the origin of the African Swine Fever outbreaks.
- To ensure that the laboratory has the necessary resources to carry out its duties in a timely and effective manner.
- To pursue investigations into the persistence of the African Swine Fever virus in ticks.
- To consider measures to discourage the type of animal husbandry favourable to the persistence of the infection.
- To ensure that the emergency killing of pigs is done in compliance with the provisions of Council Directive 93/119/EC.
- To inform the Commission of progress with the control and eradication of African Swine Fever through monthly written reports .

**7.2. To the Commission Services**

- To put Community harmonised legislation on African Swine Fever in place.
- To take appropriate measures to prevent further spread of the disease, and to accelerate its control and eradication.
- To ensure that Member States are kept fully informed of developments in the disease situation.

ANNEX 2

4. 12. 1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 310/71

## COMMISSION DECISION

of 3 December 1999

concerning certain protection measures relating to African swine fever in Portugal

(notified under document number C(1999) 4224)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(1999/789/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable to intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market<sup>(1)</sup>, as last amended by Directive 92/118/EEC<sup>(2)</sup>, and in particular, Article 10(4) thereof,

Having regard to Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the completion of the internal market<sup>(3)</sup>, as last amended by Directive 92/118/EEC, and in particular, Article 9(4) thereof,

Having regard to Council Directive 80/215/EEC of 22 January 1980 on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in meat products<sup>(4)</sup> as last amended by Directive 91/427/EEC<sup>(5)</sup>, and in particular Article 7a(2) thereof,

(1) Whereas an outbreak of African swine fever occurred in Portugal, region of Alentejo, municipality of Almodovar on 15 November 1999;

(2) Whereas Portuguese authorities have put in place measures to eradicate the disease including slaughter and destruction of all the pigs in the outbreak and in the holdings located in a 3 km radius around the outbreak;

(3) Whereas the disease situation is liable to endanger the herds in other areas of Portugal and of other Member States, in view of trade in live pigs, fresh pigmeat and certain meat-based products;

(4) Whereas information provided by Portugal on the African swine fever situation has made it possible to identify geographically areas which present a particular risk; whereas the restrictions on trade can apply on a regional basis;

(5) Whereas the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

## Article 1

1. Portugal shall not send to other Member States live pigs coming from a holding situated in those areas of the regions Alentejo and Algarve described in the Annex.

2. Portugal shall not send to other Member States live pigs originating from a holding situated in the regions Alentejo and Algarve outside those areas described in the Annex unless the animals:

— come from a holding where no live pigs have been introduced during the 30-day period immediately prior to the dispatch of the pigs in question,

— have been included in a pre-movement serological testing programme carried out within 10 days prior to transport where no antibodies to the African swine fever virus have been detected; the pre-movement testing programme for the consignment in question must be designed to give approximately 95% confidence of detecting seropositive animals at a 5% prevalence level,

— have undergone a clinical examination on the holding of origin within 24 hours prior to transport. All pigs on the holding of origin shall be examined and related facilities be inspected. The animals shall be identified by ear tags at the holding of origin so that they can be traced back to the holding of origin,

— have been transported directly from the holding of origin to the holding or slaughterhouse of destination. The means of transport shall be cleaned and disinfected with an officially approved disinfectant before loading and shall be officially sealed.

3. Intra-Community movements of the animals referred to in paragraph 2 shall only be allowed following three days advance notification to the competent authority in the Member State of destination.

## Article 2

1. Live pigs originating from a holding situated in the areas described in the Annex cannot be sent to other areas of Portugal unless the animals:

— come from a holding located at a distance of at least 10 km from the outbreak of African swine fever which occurred on 15 November 1999 and from any eventual following outbreak,

(1) L 224/18 1990, p. 29  
 (2) L 62/13 1993, p. 49  
 (3) L 193/10 1989, p. 14  
 (4) L 47/21 1980, p. 4  
 (5) L 137/1 1991, p. 161

L 310/72

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

4. 12. 1999

— are slaughtered at slaughterhouses in the regions of Alentejo and Algarve designated by the competent veterinary authorities.

— come from a holding where no live pigs have been introduced during the 30-day period immediately prior to the dispatch of the pigs in question;

— have been included in a pre-movement serological testing programme carried out within 10 days prior to transport where no antibodies to the African swine fever virus have been detected; the pre-movement testing programme for the consignment in question must be designed to give approximately 95 % confidence of detecting seropositive animals at a 5 % prevalence level,

— have undergone a clinical examination on the holding of origin within 24 hours prior to transport. All pigs on the holding of origin shall be examined and related facilities must be inspected. The animals shall be identified by ear tags at the holding of origin so that they can be traced back to the holding of origin,

— have been transported directly from the holding of origin to the designated slaughterhouse. The means of transport shall be cleaned and disinfected with an officially approved disinfectant before loading and immediately after unloading and shall be officially sealed.

2. Live pigs originating from a holding situated in the regions of Alentejo and Algarve outside those areas described in the Annex cannot be moved to other regions of Portugal unless the animals:

— come from a holding where no live pigs have been introduced during the 30-day period immediately prior to the dispatch of the pigs in question,

— have been included in a pre-movement serological testing programme carried out within 10 days prior to transport where no antibodies to the African swine fever virus have been detected; the pre-movement testing programme for the consignment in question must be designed to give approximately 95 % confidence of detecting seropositive animals at a 5 % prevalence level.

— have undergone a clinical examination on the holding of origin within 24 hours prior to transport. All pigs on the holding of origin shall be examined and related facilities must be inspected. The animals shall be identified by ear tags at the holding of origin so that they can be traced back to the holding of origin.

— have been transported directly from the holding of origin to the holding or slaughterhouse of destination. The means of transport shall be cleaned and disinfected with an offi-

cially approved disinfectant before loading and shall be officially sealed.

3. Live pigs sent to other areas of Portugal in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 must be accompanied during transport to the holding or slaughterhouse of destination by a health document issued by an official veterinarian.

#### Article 3

1. Portugal shall not send to other Member States fresh pigmeat and pigmeat products obtained from pigs originating from holdings situated in those areas described in the Annex.

2. The restrictions described in paragraph 1 shall not apply to meat products which have undergone one of the treatments laid down in Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 80/215/EEC.

#### Article 4

1. The health certificate provided for in Council Directive 64/432/EEC<sup>(1)</sup>, as last amended by Directive 98/99/EC<sup>(2)</sup> accompanying pigs sent from the regions Alentejo and Algarve in Portugal in accordance with Article 1(2) or from other regions of Portugal to other Member States must be completed with the following:

'Animals in accordance with Commission Decision 1999/789/EC concerning certain protection measures relating to African swine fever in Portugal.'

2. Fresh meat of pigs which come from holdings located in areas of Portugal not listed in the Annex consigned from the territory of Portugal to other Member States shall be accompanied by a certificate from an official veterinarian. The certificate shall bear the following words:

'Meat conforming to Commission Decision 1999/789/EC concerning certain protection measures relating to African swine fever in Portugal.'

3. Meat products of pigs which come from holdings located in areas of Portugal not listed in the Annex or that have undergone one of the treatments laid down in Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 80/215/EEC, consigned from the territory of Portugal to other Member States shall be accompanied by a certificate from an official veterinarian. The certificate shall bear the following words:

'Meat products conforming to Commission Decision 1999/789/EC concerning certain protection measures relating to African swine fever in Portugal.'

#### Article 5

Portugal will submit a programme for the surveillance of African swine fever in the regions Alentejo and Algarve to the Commission by 3 December 1999.

#### Article 6

This Decision is applicable until 31 January 2000.

<sup>(1)</sup> JO L 121, 29.7.1964, p. 1977/64

<sup>(2)</sup> OJ L 358, 31.12.1998, p. 107

*Article 7*

The Member States shall amend the measures which they apply to trade so as to bring them into compliance with this Decision. They shall immediately inform the Commission thereof.

*Article 8*

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels, 3 December 1999.

*For the Commission*  
David BYRNE  
*Member of the Commission*

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*ANNEX**Municipalities in Alentejo*

Barrancos  
Mértola  
Moura  
Serpa  
Aljustrel  
Almodôvar  
Alvão  
Beja  
Castro Verde  
Cuba  
Ferreira do Alentejo  
Ourique  
Vidigueira

*Municipalities in Algarve*

Loulé  
Alcoutim  
Silves

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ANNEX 3



COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels,  
C(2000)

Final

Draft

**COMMISSION DECISION**

**amending Decision 1999/789/EC concerning certain protection measures relating to African swine fever in Portugal**

(Memorandum from Mr. D. BYRNE)

Draft

## COMMISSION DECISION

**amending Decision 1999/789/EC concerning certain protection measures relating to African swine fever in Portugal**

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market<sup>1</sup>, as last amended by Council Directive 92/118/EEC<sup>2</sup>, and, in particular, Article 10 (4) thereof,

Having regard to Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Community trade with a view to the completion of the internal market<sup>3</sup>, as last amended by Council Directive 92/118/EEC, and in particular, Article 9 (4) thereof,

Having regard to Council Directive 80/215/EEC<sup>4</sup> of 22 January 1980, on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in meat products as last amended by Council Directive 91/687/EEC<sup>5</sup>, and in particular Article 7bis (2) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) an outbreak of African swine fever occurred in Portugal, region of Alentejo, municipality of Almodovar on 15 November 1999;
- (2) by Decision 1999/789/EC<sup>6</sup> the Commission adopted certain disease control measures to prevent spreading of the disease;
- (3) by Decision <sup>7</sup> the Commission approved a plan for the surveillance of African swine fever submitted by Portugal, including further disease control measures;

<sup>1</sup> OJ L 224, 18.8.1990, p. 39.

<sup>2</sup> OJ L 62, 15.3.1993, p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> OJ L 47, 21.2.1980, p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> OJ L 377, 31.12.1991, p. 161.

<sup>6</sup> OJ L 310, 4.12.99, p. 71.

<sup>7</sup> reference to the Decision approved by the Standing Veterinary Committee on 7 December 1999, that is still to be published.

- (4) in the light of the evolution of the situation Commission Decision 1999/789/EC must be amended;
- (5) the measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Veterinary Committee,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

*Article 1*

The Annex of Decision 1999/789/EC is replaced by the Annex to this Decision.

*Article 2*

Paragraph 1 of article 2 of Decision 1999/789/EC is replaced by the following paragraph:

- "1. Live pigs originating from a holding situated in the areas described in the Annex can not be sent to other areas of Portugal unless the animals:
  - come from a holding where no live pigs have been introduced during the 30-day period immediately prior to the dispatch of the pigs in question,
  - have been included in a pre-movement serological testing programme carried out within ten days prior to transport where no antibodies to the African swine fever virus have been detected; the pre-movement testing programme for the consignment in question must be designed to give approximately 95% confidence of detecting seropositive animals at a 5% prevalence level,
  - have undergone a clinical examination on the holding of origin within 24 hours prior to transport. All pigs on the holding of origin shall be examined and related facilities must be inspected. The animals shall be identified by ear tags at the holding of origin so that they can be traced back to the holding of origin.
  - shall be transported directly from the holding of origin to the holding or slaughterhouse of destination. In case of transport of pigs for breeding or production, the holding of destination must be located in the regions of Alentejo or Algarve. In case of transport of slaughter pigs, the slaughterhouse of destination must be designated by the competent veterinary authorities and must be located in the regions of Alentejo or Algarve or in the municipalities of Mafra, Loures, Sintra or Montijo. The means of transport shall be cleaned and disinfected with an officially approved disinfectant before loading and immediately after unloading and shall be officially sealed. Slaughter pigs shall be kept separated from any other consignment of pigs during the slaughter operations."

*Article 3*

In Article 2 of Decision 1999/789/EC the following paragraph is added:

- "4. By derogation from paragraph 2, second indent, the competent veterinary authorities may decide that in case of slaughter pigs the serological tests are carried out on samples taken at slaughter, in accordance with the surveillance plan approved by Decision ....<sup>7</sup>, if previous serological controls carried out in the holding of origin, in relation to the implementation of this Decision have given negative result."

*Article 4*

In Article 6 of Decision 1999/789/EC the date "31 January 2000" is replaced by the date "31 March 2000".

*Article 5*

The Member States shall amend the measures which they apply to trade so as to bring them into compliance with this Decision. They shall immediately inform the Commission thereof.

*Article 6*

This Decision is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels,

*For the Commission*  
*David BYRNE*  
*Member of the Commission*

ANNEX

~~Municipalities in Alentejo~~

~~Beja~~

~~Alentejo~~

~~Castro Verde~~

~~Quercus~~

~~Municipalities in Algarve~~

~~Alentejo~~

~~Alentejo~~

~~Alentejo~~

ANEXO 3

## DÉCISION DE LA COMMISSION

du 25 janvier 2000

modifiant la décision 1999/789/CE concernant certaines mesures de protection relatives à la peste porcine africaine au Portugal

[notifiée sous le numéro C(2000) 189]

(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE)

(2000/64/CE)

Article 2

LA COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES,

vu le traité instituant la Communauté européenne,

vu la directive 90/425/CEE du Conseil du 26 juin 1990 relative aux contrôles vétérinaires et zootecniques applicables dans les échanges intracommunautaires de certains animaux vivants et produits, dans la perspective de la réalisation du marché intérieur (1), modifiée en dernier lieu par la directive 92/124/CEE (2), et notamment son article 10, paragraphe 4,

vu la directive 89/662/CEE du Conseil du 11 décembre 1989 relative aux contrôles vétérinaires applicables dans les échanges intracommunautaires dans la perspective de la réalisation du marché intérieur (3), modifiée en dernier lieu par la directive 92/124/CEE, et notamment son article 9, paragraphe 4,

vu la directive 80/215/CEE du Conseil du 22 janvier 1980 relative à des problèmes de police sanitaire en matière d'échanges intracommunautaires de produits à base de viande (4), modifiée en dernier lieu par la directive 91/676/CEE (5), et notamment son article 7 bis, paragraphe 2,

considérant ce qui suit:

- (1) En faveur de peste porcine africaine est apparu au Portugal dans la municipalité d'Almodôvar (région de l'Alentejo) le 15 novembre 1999.
- (2) Par la décision 1999/789/CE (6), la Commission a arrêté certaines mesures de lutte destinées à empêcher la propagation de la maladie.
- (3) Par la décision 2000/62/CE (7), la Commission a approuvé le plan de surveillance de la peste porcine africaine présenté par le Portugal, y compris des mesures supplémentaires de lutte contre la maladie.
- (4) Compte tenu de l'évolution de la situation, la décision 1999/789/CE doit être modifiée.
- (5) Les mesures prévues par la présente décision sont conformes à l'avis du comité vétérinaire permanent.

A ARRÊTÉ LA PRÉSENTE DÉCISION:

Article premier

L'article 2 de la décision 1999/789/CE est remplacé par l'annexe de la présente décision.

(1) JO L 206 du 18.8.1990, p. 29.  
 (2) JO L 13 du 15.3.1993, p. 49.  
 (3) JO L 30 du 30.12.1989, p. 13.  
 (4) JO L 21 du 21.2.1980, p. 4.  
 (5) JO L 31 du 31.12.1991, p. 167.  
 (6) JO L 4 du 4.12.1999, p. 71.  
 (7) Voir page 65 du présent journal officiel.

À l'article 2 de la décision 1999/789/CE, le paragraphe 1 est remplacé par le paragraphe suivant:

«1. Les porcs vivants provenant d'une exploitation située dans les zones définies à l'annexe ne peuvent être expédiés vers d'autres zones du Portugal, sauf si les animaux:

— proviennent d'une exploitation dans laquelle aucun porc vivant n'a été introduit au cours de la période de trente jours précédant immédiatement l'expédition des porcs en cause,

— sont couverts par un programme de tests sérologiques préalables aux mouvements, réalisé dans les dix jours précédant le transport et au cours duquel il n'a pas été détecté d'anticorps du virus de la peste porcine africaine; le programme de tests préalables aux mouvements appliqué au lot d'animaux en cause doit être conçu de manière à assurer un facteur de confiance d'environ 95 % dans la détection d'animaux séropositifs pour un taux de prévalence de 5 %,

— ont été soumis à un examen clinique dans l'exploitation d'origine dans les vingt-quatre heures précédant le transport. Tous les porcs de l'exploitation d'origine sont examinés et les installations connexes doivent être inspectées. Les animaux sont identifiés par des marques auriculaires dans l'exploitation d'origine de manière à pouvoir assurer leur traçabilité jusqu'à l'exploitation d'origine,

— sont transportés directement de l'exploitation d'origine jusqu'à l'exploitation ou l'abattoir de destination. En cas de transport de porcs pour l'élevage ou de porcs de production, l'exploitation de destination doit être située dans les régions de l'Alentejo ou de l'Algarve. En cas de transport de porcs destinés à l'abattage, l'abattoir de destination doit être désigné par les autorités vétérinaires compétentes et être situé dans les régions de l'Alentejo ou de l'Algarve, ou dans les municipalités de Mafra, Loures, Sintra ou Montijo. Les moyens de transport sont nettoyés et désinfectés avec un désinfectant officiellement approuvé avant le chargement et immédiatement après le déchargement et sont scellés officiellement. Les porcs destinés à l'abattage sont maintenus séparés de tout autre lot de porcs pendant les opérations d'abattage.»

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Article 3

Le paragraphe 2 de la décision 1999/789/CE, le paragraphe suivant est ajouté:

10. Par dérogation au paragraphe 2, deuxième tiret, les autorités vétérinaires compétentes peuvent décider qu'en plus des échantillons destinés à l'abattage, les tests sérologiques sont effectués sur des échantillons pris à l'abattoir, conformément au programme de surveillance approuvé par la décision 1999/789/CE, si des contrôles sérologiques antérieurs effectués dans l'exploitation d'origine, dans le cadre de l'application de cette décision, ont donné des résultats négatifs.

Article 4

Le paragraphe 6 de la décision 1999/789/CE, la date du «31 janvier 2000» est remplacée par celle du «31 mars 2000».

Article 5

Les États membres modifient les mesures qu'ils appliquent aux échanges pour les rendre conformes à la présente décision. Ils en informent immédiatement la Commission.

Article 6

Les États membres sont destinataires de la présente décision.

Fait à Bruxelles, le 25 janvier 2000.

Par la Commission

David BYRNE

Membre de la Commission

ANNEXE

Municipalités de l'Alentejo

Mértola

Almodôvar

Castro Verde

Ourique

Municipalités de l'Algarve

Loulé

Alcoutim

Silves

ANNEX-4

XXIV/3280/99

COMMISSION  
OF THE  
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY  
Health and Consumer Protection  
Directorate-general  
SANCO.E/2

**Programme for the surveillance of  
African swine fever in the regions  
Alentejo and Algarve, Portugal**

December 1999

## **PROGRAMME FOR THE SURVEILLANCE OF AFRICAN SWINE FEVER IN THE REGIONS OF ALENTEJO AND ALGARVE**

### **Introduction**

Following the approval on the SVC of 24th of November 1999 of a "Commission Decision "Concerning Certain Protective Measures Relating to African Swine Fever in Portugal" and according to article 5 a "Programme for the Surveillance of ASF in the Regions Alentejo and Algarve" is now presented.

After the outbreak of ASF that occurred last 15 th of November in Aldeia dos Fernandes and the investigations/epidemiological enquiries carried out by the Local/Regional Veterinary Services and DGV was concluded that in order to control the disease and avoid further outbreaks in the future it would be important to perform a series of measures on the surrounding areas.

It was also concluded after the first preliminary investigations performed by the Regional/ Local Veterinary Services and DGV that the situation is under control and is exclusively related with contacts between sub-clinical and chronic affected pigs and ticks living together in premises where are kept the Alentejano breed of pig. The dynamic of the appearance of the disease is not clear but we believe that the above subjects may play an important role.

The National Reference Laboratory (LNIV - Lisbon) is actually performing restriction enzyme analysis in order to compare the virus isolated from this outbreak with other virus isolated in Portugal and other parts of the world

### **Measures**

1. - Clinical inspection in pigs herds situated in Alentejo and Algarve Regions, followed by serological control for the purpose of ASF diagnosis in all situations where the Epidemiological Inquiry advises.
2. - Serological Control in all pigs herds located in the Surveillance Zone of 10Kms around the outbreak; the control is repeated 30 days later.
3. - Clinical inspection of wildboars during the hunting season with collection of samples for ASF diagnosis.
4. - Pre-movement serological control as described in Commission Decision.

Ministerio da  
Agricultura,  
do Desenvolvimento  
Rural e das Pescas

DGV  
Direcção Geral  
de Veterinária

## Programme for the Surveillance of African Swine Fever in the Regions of Alentejo and Algarve

(Complementary Information)

### 1. - Reinforcement of animal health preventive measures:

With the Programme special instructions and rules will be send to the slaughterhouses and GNR in order to reinforce the controls on animal identification and movements.

### 2. - Serological Control (Procedures)

- The serological control includes serological testing for antibodies against ASF virus. This programme will be either a partial herd test (Pré-movement and pigs herds of Alentejano breed) or total herd test (pigs herds on the Surveillance zone of 10 km around the outbreak).
- In case of antibodies are detected in a pig, the herd of origin is placed under movement restrictions.
- All sero-positive pigs are slaughtered immediately; blood and tissues are examined for virus and a serum sample examined for antibodies.
- A serological test must be carried out on all pigs at the holding (total herd test).
- Subsequent testing (retesting) will be carried out according to the following table

| Action sequence                     | Detection of antibodies (+/-) (*) |            |         |          |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------|---------|----------|
|                                     | +                                 | +          | +       | +        |
| Initial test (**)<br>(Partial Test) |                                   |            |         |          |
|                                     | Possible outcomes                 |            |         |          |
|                                     | 1                                 | 2          | 3       | 4        |
| Total Herd Test                     | +<br>SLpos                        | +<br>SLpos | -       | -        |
| First Retest                        | +<br>SL                           | -          | +<br>SL | -<br>NFA |
| Second Retest                       |                                   | -<br>NFA   |         |          |

SLpos = Slaughter the positive pig (s) (see 2(c))

SL = Slaughter the whole herd

NFA = No further action

(\*) + = One or more seropositive pigs detected

- = No detection of antibodies in pigs examined

(\*\*) When the Initial test is also a total herd test it is only necessary to the 1st and 2nd retests

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Rural e das Pescas

DGV  
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de Veterinária

### 3 - Serological Control (number of samples and time table)

- a) - The serological control on the Surveillance Zone of 10 Km involving pigs and animals sampled twice, with interval of 30 days, will be finished during January 2000; A total number of 7500 samples will be tested.
- b) - The serological control in all pig herd of Alentejano breed 600 pig herds and 6,000 animals will be sampled. The sampling will be finished by the end of February 2000.
- c) - The serological control at random in the slaughterhouses and as a pre-movement test will be done daily during the application of the Programme. It is difficult to foresee the number of samples collected every month.

### 4 - Outbreak of African Swine Fever As there is no definition of ASF in EU Legislation an uniform procedure will be followed in order to better understand the information provided.

In that sense outbreak of ASF in a herd means.

- a) - Isolation of virus in pigs
- b) - Herds with pigs that are serological positives to ASF, if those pigs or others of the same herd have lesions of ASF.
- c) - Herd with clinical signs of ASF or serological positive animals, if there is an epidemiological direct link with a confirmed outbreak.

5. - Serological control at farm level in all pig herds of the Alentejano breed.
6. - Serological control at random for the purpose of ASF diagnosis in the slaughterhouses, concerning pigs from Alentejo and Algarve other than the Alentejano Breed.
7. - Epidemiological investigation on the role of ticks in the maintenance of the disease in premises used by the Alentejano breed of pigs: the investigation will start in farms with a story of a previous outbreak of ASF and from the center to the outside.
8. - The Serological Testing Programme referred in points 4, 5 and 6 are designed to give approximately 95% confidence of detecting seropositive animals at a 5% prevalence level.
9. - The Serological Control referred in point 2 is performed in all swine of all pigherds.